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FEDERAL APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE GRANT
OR DENIAL OF CLASS ACTION STATUS
INTRODUCTION: THE CLASS ACTION
Historically, the class action was developed as a mechanism to
vindicate in one suit the claims of a group of individuals with com-
mon grievances.' Three fundamental policy considerations underlie
the class action concept: reducing the burden on the courts; eliminat-
ing the risk to parties of inconsistent determinations by different
courts relating to the same issue; and most importantly, providing "a
vehicle for redressing small injuries to a large number of persons."2
As such, the class action has become a "semi-public remedy," and can
be characterized as a strange amalgam of administrative and private
suits. 4
Prior to 1966, the party who sought class action status was faced
with a confused, and confusing, procedure. 5 In 1966, therefore, Con-
' See, Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. INn.
Com. L. REV. 501, 505 (1969); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. Ray. 684, (194 O.
2 Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 501, 504 (1969). See Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, id at 497:
The reform of Rule 23 was intended ... to rebuild the law on functional
lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litiga-
tion through representative parties.... The entire reconstruction of the
Rule bespoke an intention to promote more vigorously than before the
dual missions of the class-action device: (I) to reduce units of litigation by
bringing under one umbrella what might otherwise be many separate but
duplicating actions; (2) even at the expense of increasing litigation, to pro-
vide means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at
all.
3 Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L.
Rev, 684, 717 (1974).
1 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.IJ.N.Y. 1968).
5
 For a critical analysis of the original rule 23, together with proposals that are
embodied in the present rule, see Keefe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33
CORNELL L. Q. 327 (1948). See also Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of' the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1) 81 HARv. L. RE v. 356, 375-400
(1967) [hereinafter Kaplan. 1966 Amendments], The class action was the antidote to an
acknowledged lack of a means to redress otherwise unremediable wrongs, a concept
originally contained in Equity Rule 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912). See Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Yet Equity Rule 38
was vague, providing little more than a principle. The response to this amorphous rule
was one of overcompensation; the original rule 23 attempted a bewildering delineation
of types of action and comcomitant types of classes. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1940). Thus if
the asserted right was "joint," "common," or "secondary" the action was certified as
"true." If the right was "several," and the claim involved specific property, the action
was "hybrid." If the right was "several," with common questions of law or fact affecting
the right, and if common relief was sought, the action was "spurious." In a "spurious"
action the judgment was binding only on those members before the court. See generally,
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969); Kaplan, 1966 Amendments at 377, 380-81.
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gress completed a revision of federal Rule 23. 6 This revision was an
attempt to ensure, through a stream-lined set of procedures, both an
efficient application of the Rule to possible class actions suits, and a
measure of procedural fairness during the course of such actions.'
The intent of this reorganization was to mold the structure of Rule 23
around the intricacies and practicalities of class litigation, rather than
to force applicants to tailor their cases so as to come within the ambit
of a very mechanical structure' It was believed that the revision
would help provide two of the hoped for benefits of the class action:
the reduction of case loads and an incentive to suit."
e FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites to a class action.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representa-
tive parties on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative par-
ties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class actions maintainable.
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be diapositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests: or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained; notice; judgement;
actions conducted partially as class actions.
(I) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is
to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional.
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits....
3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.01(8] at 23-24 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
Motnif.]
"See, Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Gt:o. L. J.1204,1214 (1966).
"See Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. &COM. L. REv. 497 (1969).
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The prerequisites to a class action provided by Rule 23 (a) are:
that the class is too numerous for practicable joinder;" that questions
of law or fact are common to the class;" and that the representatives
are proper champions of the class." Meeting these threshold re-
quirements is not conclusive of class status, however, for the party
seeking to represent a class must also show that the action satisfies at
least one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).' 3 Rule 23(b)(1) pro-
vides that proponents of class action status must show that repititious
litigation might establish inconsistent results or incompatible standards
of conduct for the opposing party,".. or that individual litigation might
be dispositive of similar claims of other class members or injurious to
the ability of the others to protect their interests." Alternatively, the
party seeking certification might attempt to satisfy subdivision (b)(2),
which is a recognition that the party against whom the action is main-
tained may have acted in a manner applicable generally to all mem-
bers of the proposed class, so that injunctive or declaratory relief
would remedy the claims of the class itself." Finally, Rule 23(b)(3)
cites as proper for class certification those actions in which such com-
mon predominating questions of law or fact are presented that the
class action is superior to any other type of action." As such, subsec-
tion (b)(3) is distinguished from actions brought under (b)(1) and
(b)(2) in that there is no need of a claim for common relief.
In determining whether a particular group comes within the
parameters of Rule 23, a court must actively attempt to balance com-
peting interests. For example, the court must decide whether the
problems in defining and managing a class action are outweighed
both by the reduction in caseload which occurs when several actions
are incorporated into one, and by the improved litigating posture for
small claimants when they proceed as a class. Thus, the application of
Rule 23 to a proposed class action entails considerable judicial input,"
which is apt to be time-consuming and to immerse the court in
numerous, complex pre-trial determinations. Notwithstanding these
" FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a)(1).
" FED. R. Qv. P. 23(a)(2).
12 FED. R. Ct.'. P. 23(a)(3), (4). See 3B MOORE. 123.02-2 at 23-153.
" 3B MooitE, supra note 2, 123.02-2 at 23-153.
14 FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
" FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
" Fee. R. Cw, P. 23(b)(2). This provision apparently encompasses such areas as
civil rights litigation, where all members of a given group are similarly situated as re-
gards the effect of the opposing party's action, and where equitable relief would be the
most effective remedy for the alleged common injury. See Kaplan, 1966 Amendments,
supra note 4, at 389: "When the party opposing a class had acted on grounds apparently
applying to the whole group, a representative suit should be available to secure for the
class any appropriate injunctive or declaratory relief."
" FED. R. Cm P. 23(6)(3). Sec 311 MOORE 1 23.45(1) at 23-703. Fen. R. Cm P.
23(c)(1) provides that a class certification order may be conditional, subject to amend-
ment or withdrawal.
15 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (exhaustive dis-
cussion of' the requisite findings which precede certification of a class).
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difficulties, courts have been mindful of the fact that the class suit is a
federally created remedy.'• As such, as soon as "the court is convinced
that there is substantial merit to plaintiff's claims and that the class ac-
tion device is the practicable method of vindicating these claims, it will
not let procedural difficulties stand in its way."" This general attitude
has led the judiciary to respond to Rule 23 by resolving any doubts as
to the propriety of certification in favor of allowing the class action. 2 '
Although this liberality is not absolute, and some actions will not
be certified, the trend illustrates an aspect of Rule 23 that has been
criticized: namely, the extent to which trial courts have discretion to
grant or deny class status. 22
 The argument is made that if the trial
judge had complete discretion in this matter, then his determinations
could not be reviewed in an immediate appeal to the circuit court."
The position is countered however, by those who claim that the Rule
contains a set of objective criteria whose applicability is suspectible to
appellate review. 2 4
 If the former argument is adopted, then the only
recourse available to a movant is the writ of mandamus; the latter
theory would, however, permit an interlocutory review of the order.
The controversy over the question of when a determination of
class status is appealable has surfaced in two respects: whether a plain-
tiff who has been denied representative status should be able to in-
voke immediate appellate review as of right; and whether a defendant
has a similar opportunity to appeal an order certifying a class. The
central issue in each case is whether the order in question is appeal-
able under section 1291 of the United States Code," which dictates
that appeal will not lie from an order unless that order is final. In ap-
" id. at 481.
' 5 1d.
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969), quoting Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969). •
22 See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Gm L. J. 1204, 1228
(1966), where the author reproduces Mr. Justice Black's dissent to the transmittal of the
1966 Amendments. Justice Black was of the opinion that the revised Rule 23 would
"place too much power in the hands of the trial judges," a problem which could be
solved by a set of carefully articulated legal standards.
2' This is particularly relevant in terms of an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § I292(b),
since several authorities suggest that matters vested in the discretion of the trial court
cannot be appealed through an interlocutory proceeding. See, e.g., 9 MooRs;, supra note 7,
1,110.22121 at 261; C. WRIGHT. LAw to FEDERAL CoukTs 463 (2d ed. 1970).
24 See, e.g., Report q. American liar Association, Special Committee, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 38 F. R.D. 95, 104 (1965):
[T]here has been substituted for ... what appeared to be mechanical tests utilizing seem-
ingly fixed terms ... more descriptive terminology. As indicated below, we approve the
amendments as providing more accurate guides for the exercise of judicial control over
procedure in practice. We should be disturbed, however, if the change in the farm of
the Rule caused the Courts to determine that [the new Rule involves) only questions of
"discretion" not subject to review under Subdivision (b) of Section 1292 of Title 28.
1" 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). The statute provides in pertinent part: "The courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
104
APPELLATE REVIEW OF CLASS ACTION STATUS
plying section 1291, the Court has often stressed the importance of
the rule of finality." However, this position has been tempered by the
realization that a narrow and strict application of that principle is un-
workable in certain situations. Consequently, the court has created
several exceptions to the general rule," with the result that certain
orders which are in reality interlocutory are treated as final for the
purpose of allowing an immediate appeal by right.
If an order does not fall within section 1291 or one of its excep-
tions, then usually the only mechanism of appeal is found in section
1292 of the code. 28 Such orders are treated as interlocutory, and as
such they are not appealable as of right;" rather, under section
1292(b)a0 the trial court has discretion to certify the order for appeal
and circuit court has discretion to deny review.
In some instances, an order denying class action status has been
deemed interlocutory, and thus there is no appeal as of right under
section 1291. 31 A small number of orders granting class certification
have, however, been appealed immediately, not through the statutory
" See, e.g., Forgay v, Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
27 The Court has allowed certain appeals by right from certain orders issued be-
fore a final judgment has been entered in the following cases: Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964) (exception for orders "fundamental to the further
conduct of the case"); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (ex-
ception for orders "collateral to the case and separable from the merits"); Forgay v.
Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848) (exception fir orders visiting "irreparable harm").
" 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970), however, delineates several circumstances suscepti-
ble to immediate appeal. This section provides, in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continu-
ing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions; or refusing to dissolve
or modify injunctions except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court;
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to
wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the Mu-poses thereof,
such as directing sales or other disposalS of property;
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges
thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty
cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed;
(4) Judgments in civil actions for patent infringement which are
final except for accounting.
3° 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon,
in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if applica-
tion is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided,
however, that application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceed-
ings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals
or a judge thereof shall so order.
"E.g., King v. Kansas City S. Indus., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973).
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methods of section 1291 or 1292, but through the operation of the
death knell doctrine developed by the Second Circuit." Under this
doctrine, a plaintiff whose individual claim is so small that the denial
of class status would force him to cease the litigation due to the una-
vailablity of counsel, has the right to bring an immediate direct
appeal. 33 In the same manner, courts usually deny defendant's ap-
peals from orders granting class status as not final, although the re-
cent emergence of the reverse death knell doctrine, 34 also initiated by
the Second Circuit," has provided for the immediate appeal of class
certification orders in situations where the potential recovery is very
large, and where the plaintiff could appeal under the death knell rule
if class status was denied. 36
In light of this situation, the manner in which the Supreme
Court has applied the section 1291 rule of finality becomes crucial to
the ability to appeal an order granting or denying class status, and
thereby becomes crucial to the class action strategy itself. The creation
of the two death knell doctrines, as they are interwoven with previous
judicially defined exceptions to the final order rule, mark a significant
development in the law pertaining to class action suits. An under-
standing of the class action suit therefore necessitates an inquiry into
the pivotal question of whether parties to a class action have a right
immediately to appeal orders granting or denying class status, or
whether their appeal of such an order should depend upon the dis-
cretion of the courts. Resolution of this issue requires first a close ex-
amination of the available avenues of appeal, both those legislatively
mandated and those judicially created. This initial examination will
serve as a framework within which the newly developed doctrines that
allow appellate review of certification orders will be considered. In
light of this consideration, it will be suggested that, while the
plaintiff-oriented death knell doctrine is consistent with the rule of fi-
nality as it has been traditionally expressed and interpreted, the re-
verse death knell doctrine is not. Rather, defendant's appeals from
class certification orders should be defined as interlocutory only,
thereby requiring use of the legislative method of appeal contained in
section 1292(b).
1. APPEALABILITY
A. Final Orders
The conceptual basis for the rule of finality, presently codified
33 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 (1967) (Eisen I).
33 See text at notes 109-117 infra.
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3249 (Oct. 5, 1976).
36 Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974).
3° See text at notes 166.201 infra.
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in section 1291 of the Judicial Code," can be found in two policy con-
siderations. First, the rule is grounded in the belief that the district
courts should be given primary control of litigation, free from con-
stant monitoring by the circuit courts." By conditioning review upon
finality, the rule serves to minimize tension between the district and
appellate courts. 39 The second policy consideration supporting the
rule is the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation by seeking to ensure
that there is only one appeal for each case rather than several." This
policy further serves to reduce the amount of judicial time devoted to
each action, and increases the likelihood that a circuit court will be
presented with a "ripe" record containing all the facts necessary to a
complete consideration of the order entered below by the district
court."
Since section 1291 permits appeals only from "final" orders, del-
inition of that term is central to the question of appealability. This
problem is complicated by the several different definitions of finality
which have been proposed. For example, it has been suggested that
an order is final if it is one which ends litigation on the merits, leaving
nothing but the execution of judgment. 42 "Finality" also has been
deemed to attach to an order which is no longer open to
reconsideration.'"
In that these definitions focus only upon those orders which,
chronologically, are issued at the close of a trial on merits, they are of
limited usefulness, since some orders issued during or even before a
trial can have an equally conclusive or "final" effect. The Supreme
Court has recognized that where such orders are concerned, strict
adherence to a narrow definition of finality may visit undeserved and
37 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
39
 Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1975). See Note,
Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 Couilu, L. REV. 1292,
1302 (1970) [hereinafter, Note, Interlocutory Appeals]. In Parkinson the Second Circuit
noted that "step-by-step intrusions by the appellate courts ... might engender a de-
bilitating lessening of respect for the capabilities of district judges," 520 F.2d at 652.
This respect is necessary to the efficient functioning of the court system. The resulting
tendency towards the orderly conduct of litigation also promotes a "healthy legal sys-
tem." Cobbledick v, United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326 (1940).
3 " Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1975).
"Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233.254 (1945); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 MARV. L.
REv. 351 (1961) [hereinafter Note, Appealability]. Judicial economy has become an in-
creasingly important consideration. See generally, Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the
Court of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 MARV. L.
REV. 542 (1969),
" Note, Class Action Certification Orders: An Argument for The Defendant's Right to
Appeal, 42 GEo. VVAtiii. L. REV. 621, 631 (1974) thereinafter Note, Defendant's Right to
Appeal].
"Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 223 (1945); 4 C.J.S.-Appeal and Error §
94(a) at 252 (1957).
is Hatzenbuliler v. Talbot, 132 F.2d 192, 193 (7th Cir. 1943).
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irremediable harm." The Court has therefore created three judicial
exceptions to the rule: an exception for orders resulting in irreparable
harm; 45 one for collateral orders; 49 and a third for orders concerning
rights fundamental to the further conduct of the case. 47 These excep-
tions effectively recognize certain orders as final which might other-
wise be treated as interlocutory and therefore not appealable as of
right.
The first exception was formulated in Forgay v. Conrad, 48 where
the Supreme Court held that orders which result in irreparable injury
are final and appealable under the predecessor of section 1291. 49 In
Forgay, the trial court had ordered that certain disputed deeds be set
aside as fraudulent and void, with a resultant transfer of title to the
plaintiff-appellee. It then continued the case until a court-appointed
master could take an accounting of any profits which defendant-
appellant may have received during the period between the filing of
the bill and the delivery of the property." The appellants appealed
on the theory that the order was final. The appellees contended that
the order could not be final since the accounting remained
unaccomplished. 5 ' Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention, noting that the issue of title had been decided, and that the
district court's order required the transfer of the land." Were the ap-
peal to be delayed until after the accounting, the property might well
be sold. The appellant then would not be able to recover it and would
thereby be irreparably harmed."
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 4 the Court de-
lineated a second exception to the finality rule fir orders collateral to
the main issues and separable from the merits. Cohen was an action
brought against the officers and directors of the corporate defendants
See For-gay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848):
Undoubtedly [the order at issue) is not final, in the strict, technical sense
of that term. But this court. has not heretofore understood the words
"final decrees" in this strict and technical sense, but has given them a more
liberal, and, as we think, a more reasonable construction, and one more
consonant to the intention of the legislature.
Also, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 1 541, 546 (1949) ("(w)hen that
time comes [when the entire case is susceptible to appeal]. it will be too late effectively
to review the present order, and the rights conferred ... will have been lost, probably
irreparably.")
" Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848) (accounting and distribution of
profits from disputed land). See text at notes 48-53 infra.
4 ° Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (pre-trial indem-
nification for costs and fees). See text at notes 46-52 infra.
47 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964) (pre-trial dismissal
of several claims). See text at notes 53-65 infth.
48 47 U.S. (6 How.) '201 (1848).
' 9 1 Stat. 73, 84 (1789).
"47 U.S. (6 How.) at 202-03.
51 Id.
"Id. at 204.
53 Id.
54 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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charging them with fraudulent mismanagement of corporate assets."'
An initial issue arose as to whether the plaintiff should indemnify the
legal expenses incurred by the other party." The district court de-
cided that a state law which required a plaintiff pressing a small claim
to indemnify the defendant against costs and attorneys' fees was not
applicable to an action brought in federal court.`'' The circuit court,
accepting a section 1291 appeal, believed that the state law was appli-
cable and reversed. 58 The Supreme Court found that the circuit court
had jurisdiction over the appeal, stating that the applicability of sec-
tion 1291 was not limited to those orders which terminate an action, 5 "
but included those orders which "fall in that small class which finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights as-
serted in the action, too important to be denied review and too inde-
pendent to the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."" The Court acknow-
ledged, however, that the Cohen exception would include neither or-
ders which remain subject to change as the action progresses at trial"'
nor those which will merge with the final judgment," since such or-
ders would not be fully independent of the issues central to the case.
The third exception to the finality rule was formulated in
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.," where the Court held that orders
which are fundamental to the conduct of the case are final."
Petitioner brought this suit as administratrix of the estate of her son,
who had died while working on respondent's ship. She sought to re-
cover damages for wrongful death, both for herself and for the
decedent's dependent sister and brother." The action was based in
negligence under the Jones Act," general maritime law," and Ohio
statutes." The district court found that the Jones Act provided the
sole remedy, and consequently, that the brother and sister were not
entitled to any benefits." The plaintiff immediately appealed to the
circuit court and also sought a writ of mandamus to compel the dis-
trict court either to strike the order or to certify a section 1292(13)
appeal." The circuit court, treating the appeal as final, affirmed the
" Id. at 543.
56
 7 F.R.D. 352, 353 (D,N.J. 1947).
"Id. at 355.
58
 Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2(.1 14 (3d Cir. 1948).
5" 337 U.S. at 545.
"Id. at 546.
Id. ("ISJo long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there
may be no intrusion by appeal.")
"Id.
"379 U.S. 148 (1964).
"Id. at 154.
" Id. at 149-50.
"" 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
"7 379 U.S. at 150.
68
 01110 REV. CODE ANN. g 2125.01.
" 379 U.S. at 150-51.
"Id. at 151.
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district court's order. 7 ' The Supreme Court, while noting that a sec-
tion 1292(b) appeal would have been proper, decided that the circuit
court had correctly promoted the congressional policy underlying sec-
tion 1292(b) 72
 by allowing a section 1291 appeal. 73 This result was
found appropriate because the issues involved in the order were
deemed "fundamental to the further conduct of the case,"" particu-
larly in light of the fact that the brother and sister might have suf-
fered an injustice if their claims for recovery were allowed to be vi-
tiated by the district court's order: 75
These three judicial exceptions were fashioned to remedy the
unusual situation in which a narrow application of the section 1291
rule of finality would result in irreparable injury." The task of iden-
tifying these exceptional circumstances is often a difficult one, though,
since there is a spectrum of orders falling between those which are
clearly final, and those which are obviously interlocutory. In these
marginal cases the decision as to the availability of an appeal involves
a balancing of the costs and inconvenience of piecemeal review against
the possibility of injustice through delay." In this situation, the rule
of finality must be given a "practical rather than a technical
construction." 78
B. Interlocutory Orders.
Cognizant that strict adherence to the rule of finality might work
71 321 F.2d 518, 522, 532 (6th Cir. 1963).
7 : See text at notes 73-95 infra.	 '
73 379 U.S. at 154.
" Id. at 153-54.
" Id. at 153.
76 It could be postulated that the standard used by the Court in determining
when an intrusion into the realm of finality is justified has been lessened over the years.
For instance, in Forgay, the Court noted that the appellants would be "subject to ir-
reparable injury" should the order remain in force. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848).
Sixty years later, the standard was apparently less strict. In Cohen, the Court noted that
certain rights might have been lost, "probably irreparably." 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (em-
phasis added). In Gillespie, the Court stated, in deciding not to remand, that the time
element "might work a great injustice" on the parties. 379 U.S. 148, 153 (1964). These
are not incompatible standards, however, as the language merely illustrates the proba-
ble result of a refusal by the Court to give a practical construction to the rule of finality.
The test remains one of balancing the costs and inconvenience of allowing piecemeal
review, against the potential injustice that might result. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152-53.
" 379 U.S. at 152-53.
TH Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. As one scholar has commented, "The source of the dif-
ficulty [in defining finality] is that the Court, torn between the usual wisdom of the
final judgment rule and its inappropriateness in certain unusual situations, has followed
'a pragmatic approach to the question of finality'." C. Witic.itT, Handbook of the Law of
Federal Courts 101 at 453 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter C. Wright, FEDERAL COURTS],
quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). Application of this
pragmatic view, while a permissible expansion of the traditional definition of finality,
Wright, supra at 458, should he confined to the unusual case lest they undermine the
rule of law governing appealability under section 1291, Frank, Requiem for the Final
Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. RE.- v, 292, 320 (1967).
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injustice, Congress delimited two methods of appeal from interlocu-
tory orders in section 1292. 79 Section 1292(a) provides for appeal as of
right from a limited class of interlocutory orders, such as those grant-
ing or affecting injunctions, or those issued in admiralty cases and in
civil actions for infringement of patents." Appeals from other inter-
locutory orders may be brought under section 1292(b). These appeals
are, however, subject to the dual discretion of both the district and
circuit courts, since under 1292(h) the district court must first certify
the appeal, over which the circuit court may then exercise its
jurisdiction." By requiring that both the district and circuit courts ex-
ercise discretion in allowing the appeal, the section prevents dilatory
tactics and spurious appeals. 82
Section 1292(b) requires that the district court state in writing
that the order being appealed concerns a controlling question of law,
that there is ground for difference of opinion as to the efficacy of the
order which was entered; and that an immediate appeal would mater-
ially advance the resolution of the case. 83 A matter of major concern
to the courts is defining the phrase "controlling question of law" for
purposes of section 1292(h). It has been suggested that a "controlling
question" must be one that is dispositive of the case. 84 Yet Congress it-
self indicated that a section 1292(h) appeal might lie from orders in-
volving impleader or change of venue, 85 orders which certainly cannot
be deemed crucial to the continuation of the case. Although this dif-
ference between judicial and congressional attitudes indicates that the
issue is not yet settled, it appears that the order must concern some
rule of law which will have a material effect on the course of the
lawsuit."
The second prerequisite for a section 1292(b) appeal, that there
is a difference of opinion concerning the rule of law adopted by the
court, requires that the difference be substantial." This requirement
seems a natural one: every order issued will have been argued by both
parties to the suit and it seems unlikely that the conflicting opinions
urged by opposing parties should ever support a section 1292(h) ap-
peal. Moreover, it is unlikely that a district judge would certify an
order for appeal where there is only an inconsequential difference of
opinion.88 Further, the requirement of substantiality seems mandated
70 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970).
" 0 1d. § 1292(a). For the relevant text of § 1292(a) see note 29 supra.
"' Id. § I 292(b). See note 30, .supra, for the relevant text of 1292(b).
Holteoff, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 47 GEo, L.J. 474, 479 (1959):
Note, 54 OM L.J. 940. 943 (1966).
"See, Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1938, 23 F.R.D. 199, 202 (1959).
"See Note, Appealability, supra note 32, at 379.
88 14.R. REP. No, 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1958), quoted in, Milbert v. Bison
Laboratories, Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958).
"See Katz v. Carle Blanche Corp., 496 F.2i1 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1974).
87 S. REP. No, 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, [1958] U.S. Coati CoNc. &
An. NEWS 5255, 5257.
OH See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754-55 (3d Cir. 1974).
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by the policy considerations underlying section 1292(b). Any lesser
standard would allow numerous wasteful appeals and would increase
the time spent on any one case, rather than aid in simplifying and re-
solving complex litigation. The requirement of substantiality may be
satisfied when the order entered is contrary to the weight of
authority," when there is a clear split among the circuits on the con-
troverted point, 90 or when the order involves a novel issue."
In certifying section 1292(b) appeals, courts have relied less fre-
quently upon the third criterion, which is based on a determination
whether an appeal would materially advance the progress of the
litigation. 92 In fact, this ground seems most often invoked when the
case could be tried and decided in a few days. 93 While this is admit-
tedly a salutary way in which to use section 1292(b), it is suggested
that this criterion, used in conjunction with either or both of the two
others, could be advantageously applied to validate an appeal from an
order issued during what promises to be a very long trial. The mate-
rial advancement of any litigation is a goal to be sought. It seems logi-
cal that the more time that is freed, the more willing the courts
should be to certify appeals.
Shortly after section I292(b) was enacted, the Third Circuit ex-
amined the application of the section's three requirements in Milbert v.
Bison Laboratories, Inc."' In Milbert, an action based on negligence, the
corporate defendant moved to dismiss the action, and in the alterna-
tive to quash the return of the service of summons. 95 The trial court
found that a question of fact existed concerning the allegation that
the defendant had fraudulently incorporated in another state to limit
its tort liability." The defendants then attempted a section 1292(b)
appeal. The circuit court found two defects fatal to the appeal. First,
the trial judge had not certified the appeal; second, the statutory ten
day period within which an appeal must be filed"' had run." This re-
sult obtained because the court believed that the new law should be
"strictly construed and applied.""" In addition, the court indicated
that this section should be applied only to those "exceptional" cases
" See Note, 54 GEO. L.J. 940, 947 (1966).
" See Note, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour
Through Section I 292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 342 (1969).
" See Note, 54 Gm. L.J. 940, 948 (1966); see, e.g., Chadwick v. Air Reduction
Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 250 (N.1). Ohio 1965).
"2 One case which did rely upon this ground in rufusing to certify an appeal was
Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. General Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1964).
" E.g., Kraus v. Board of County Rd. Comm'rs, 364 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir.
1966).
"' 260 F.2c1 431 (3d Cir. 1958). Section 1292(6) was enacted 2 September 1958,
the district court order was entered 24 September 1958, the appeal was submitted 20
October 1958 and decided 28 October 1958.
as Wymer v. Bison Laboratories, Inc., 166 F. Stipp. 3, 4 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
"
97 28 U.S.C.	 1292(6) (1970).
9" 260 F.2d at 435.
" 9 Id.
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where an intermediate appeal would obviate lengthy and expensive
litigation, lest the "floodgates" be opened to countless appeals.'"
In reaching this decision, the Milbert court drew extensively from
legislative history,'" including the Senate Report on the bill.'" This
report noted that allowing intermediate appeals from orders which, if
reversed, would have a substantial effect on the course of litigation,
would result in a lightening of the case load at the district court
level.'° 3 The Senate Report also stated that an avenue of appeal was
particularly needed for orders which were entered in a plaintiffs favor,
for such orders do not terminate the litigation and therefore were not
appealable prior to the enactment of section 1292(b). 1 " Since the
purpose behind section 1292(b) would be frustrated were the statute
to become a means of bringing spurious appeals, Congress provided
that both the circuit and district courts must exercise discretion before
an appeal is allowed.'"°
Milbert and the Senate Report, taken together, seem to indicate a
judicial and legislative concern over the plight confronting suitors in
complex litigation. On this basis, it appears that section 1292(b) was
primarily intended to alleviate the burdens on judicial time and liti-
gants' resources presented by longthy and expensive litigation.'" Sec-
tion 1292(b), then, complements section 1291 by providing an avenue
of appeal—albeit at the court's discretion—from orders which do not
fit within a technical definition of finality. Yet section 1292(b) did not
displace the exceptions to the final, order rule embodied in section
1291. Indeed, one exception to section 1291, created by the Supreme
Court in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. For orders fundamental to
the case, 107 was fashioned eight years after the enactment of section
1292(b). Such action by the Court may be viewed as a judicial recogni-
tion that certain orders which do not conform precisely to the criteria
of finality, should nevertheless be appealable as of right, and should
not be subject to a court's discretion. It must be assumed that the
Court, aware of the availability of section 1292(b) appeals, wished to
further delineate a sub-set of cases involving exceptional circum-
"" Id. at 433.
"' Id. at 433-35.
1 " 2 S. REP. Nu. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19581 U.S. Code Gong. &
Admin, News 5255.
1-0°
	 at 5256-57. TI IC report cited as an example, a case in which a circuit court,
eight months after the order had been entered, found that the district court should
have granted a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
"4 Id. at 5256.
mid. at 5257.
"'Cy. 379 U.S. 148 (1964): see text at notes 63-75 supra, The ABA Committee
on Rules stated that section 1292(b) should be used more frequently to aid in clarifying
the application of the rules of federal procedure, including the revised Rule 23. Report
of American Bar Association Special Committee, Federal Rules of Procedure, 38 F.R.D.
95, 104 (1965). The strict interpretation of § 1292(b) found in Bison was specifically
criticized. Id.
1 ° 7 379 U.S. 148 ( 1964). Sec text at notes 63-75 supra.
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stances. Thus, the exceptions to section 1291 would seem to be an af-
firmative statement by the Court that some burdens can only be rem-
edied by appeals by right. Clearly, the Supreme Court has taken the
initiative in fashioning a valuable tool out of what could be a sterile
legislative scheme. It remains to be seen, though, whether the circuit
courts have taken a similarly permissible stance in the class action
area.
II. THE DEATH KNELL DOCTRINE
The death knell doctrine was created by the Second Circuit to
allow appeals in the limited situation in which orders denying a plain-
tiff class status are seen to come within the purview of the Cohen
collateral order exception in that such orders have concluded certain
of plaintiffs rights.'" Such orders have therefore been deemed final
and appealable under section 1291. 10° Thus, when a plaintiff, pos-
sessed of a very small claim, is denied representative status, he or she
has the right to appeal this decision to the circuit court."° The scope
of the death knell doctrine is narrow, as it applies only to those cases
in which the individual claim is so small that there is no incentive for
a plaintiff to pursue the litigation alone, so that the denial of class cer-
tification effectively terminates the action."'
The death knell doctrine had its inception in Eisen v. Carlisle and
Jacquelin (Eisen I)," 2
 where the plaintiff sued two major "off-lot" deal-
ers on the New York Stock Exchange for allegedly violating the anti-
trust and securities laws." The district court granted the defendant's
motion to deny class certification, but without prejudice to the
plaintiff's ability to pursue the suit alone." 4 The Second Circuit al-
lowed the plaintiff to appeal this order under section 1291." 5 Ac-
knowledging that not all such orders are appealable, the court of ap-
peals relied on the Supreme Court's willingness to apply the finality
rule pragmatically rather than harshly.'" Assessing the facts in this
light, the court found that the case came within the Cohen collateral
order exception, since the order denying certification was separable
from the merits. Further, the order entered by the district court was
1 " For a discussion of Cohen see text at notes 46-52 supra.
1 " Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1035 (1967). See Parkinson v. April Indus., inc., 520 F.2d 650, 653 n.l (2d
Cir. 1975): Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 895.96 (9th Cir. 1975). But see King v.
Kansas City S. Indus., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973).
IS Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966): where the de-
nial of class status "is the death knell of the action, review should be allowed."
"' Id.
" 2 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cent, denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
" 3 Id. at 119-20.
1 " 41 F.R.D. 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
11 ' 370 F.2d at 121.
" 3 Id. at 120. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53
(1964).
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found to work irreparable harm on the plaintiff, as no competent
lawyer would undertake the litigation of such a small claim.'" Absent
an immediate appeal, then, the cause of action would probably never
have been litigated.
To trigger the application of the death knell rule, a plaintiff's
claim must fall within a relatively small range of dollar requirements.
The Second Circuit refined the death knell doctrine in two cases de-
cided together, Korn v. Franchard Corp. and Milberg v. Western Pacific
Railroad Co.'" In Korn, plaintiffs had purchased interests in a limited
partnership, relying upon an allegedly misleading prospectus." 9 The
average investment of the claim which plaintiff's sought to represent
was fixed at $5,000.' 29
 The district court denied class status because it
believed that joinder of the members of the proposed class was riot
impracticable, and that the requirements of Rule 23(a)( 0121 had
therefore not been satisfied.' 22 The Second Circuit applied the death
knell doctrine and allowed the appeal.'"
In Milberg, plaintiff alleged that she had bought sixty-five shares
of defendant's common stock in reliance upon an overly optimistic es-
timate of quarterly earnings printed in an article published by the de-
fendant, Dow joneS. 124 The district court denied the motion for class
status, finding that plaintiff had failed to make a showing of a sub-
stantial possibility of success on the merits.'" Despite the holding in
Korn, the circuit court refused to apply the death knell doctrine in
Milberg and denied the appeal.' 26
The operative distinction between the two cases is the amount
sought in damages. In Korn, the highest estimate of damages, $386
was so little as to make further action unlikely.'" In Milberg, however,
the claim was at least $8,500, a figure so near the federal jurisdic-
tional minimum as to suggest that the suit would be pressed individu-
ally by the plaintiff. 12" The difference between these dollar figures il-
17 As the Second Circuit stated:
We can safely assume that no lawyer of competence is going to undertake
this complex and costly case to recover $70 for Mr. Eisen. ... If the ap-
peal is dismissed, not only will Eisen's claims never be adjudicated, but no
appellate court will be given the chance to decide if this class action was
proper under the newly amended Rule 23.
370 F.2d at 120; see text at note 37 supra.
"8 943 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
'" Id, at 1303.
1221d.
" I FED. R. Cfv. P. 23. See note 2 supra.
"2 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REr. (CCH). 192,845, at 90,167
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
123 443 F.2d at 1306.
124 Id. at 1303.
125 51 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Dolgow v. Anderson. 43 F.R.D. 472,
501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
t" 443 F.2d at 1306-07.
127 1d. at 1306.
12 ' Id. at 1306-07. This figure included both plaintiff's individual $1000 claim,
and the $7500 claim presented by her attorney-husband.
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lustrates both the narrow range within which the death knell rule will
operate, as well as the strength of the Second Circuit's stance that, but
for the carefully tailored death knell exception, class designation or-
ders are not final and therefore cannot be appealed.'" While the
court gave thoughtful consideration to arguments advanced in favor
of broad appealability, this position was rejected, primarily out of fear
of a resulting case overload at the circuit court level. The court be-
lieved that to avoid such backlogs the death knell doctrine must be
given a limited interpretation.' 3(.)
In Korn can be found the germination of discontentent with the
death knell doctrine. Judge Friendly, while concurring in the result
and acknowledging the decision as the logical answer to the applica-
tion of existing law, 13 ' nevertheless questioned the continued vitality
of the death knell doctrine. While Friendly recognized that the doc-
trine presented a valuable aid to small claimants,' 32 he was disturbed
by the ad hoc nature of its application)." Apparently, Judge
Friendly's concern lay in the fact that the death knell doctrine re-
quired that each case be measured against the nebulous concept of
"motive for continuing the suit," 134 without any judicial delimitation
of the point at which this incentive ends and disincentive begins."'
Judge Friendly was further disturbed by the inequality of treatment
afforded defendants who could not invoke the death knell doctrine
upon certification of a class.' 36
Although the death knell doctrine has generally met with
approval,'" Judge Friendly is not alone in his opposition to the rule.
Id. at 1305.
150
13 ' Id. at 1307 (Friendly, j., concurring).
' 32 1 am not sure it affords a rule that is truly workable, or, indeed, is legally
sustainable." Id. at 1307. In Shayne v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 491 F.2d 397,
400-01 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit declined to review the death knell doctrine,
since Eisen III was at that time pending at the Supreme Court, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), and
the question of appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from class designation orders had
been briefed and argued at the request of the Court. For an overview of the history of
the Eisen cases, see Note, 16 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 254 (1975). In Shayne, the claim
was sufficiently close to the $8,500 involved in Milberg to make the order non-
appealable under § 1291. 491 F.2d at 402.
' 33 443 F.2d at 1307.
Shayne v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 491 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1974).
'" Eventually, some dollar figure would undoubtedly be reached, above which
no appeal would lie. Beyond any problems with the arbitrary nature of such a rule, es-
tablishing this figure would involve much judicial time and litigational expense, as case
after case was examined to determine where the line should be drawn.
136 443 F.2d at 1307. A major rationale underlying the reverse death knell rule
was to remedy this inequality. Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 659 (2c1
Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring).
' 37 Several Circuits have accepted the doctrine, e.g., Williams v. Mumford, 511
F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Weingarten v. Union Oil Co., 431 F.2d 26, 28-29 (9th
Cir. 1970), rerl. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d 124, 126
(5th Cir.), reri. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973) (adopting a modified form of the doctrine,
wherein the court required the plaintiff to first carry the burden of developing a fac-
tual record indicating that the action will terminate if a class is not certified); Ott v.
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Two circuits have also noted dissatisfaction with the doctrine and have
not followed the Second Circuit.'" For example, in Hackett v. General
Host Corp.,"d although recognizing the role that the doctrine could
play, the Third Circuit did not believe that the death knell rule came
within the parameters of the Cohen exception to the value of finality,
or that the death knell rule merited treatment as a new and indepen-
dent exception. 140
Hackett involved an antitrust action brought under the Clayton
Act."' In Hackett, the district court found that the proposed class was
unmanageable and therefore denied the putative representative class
status; 142 the court also refused to certify an appeal under section
1292(b).'" Plaintiffs then attempted to appeal under section 1291.
The circuit court, however, declined to adopt the death knell doctrine
and dismissed the appeal. 144.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Third Circuit in Hackett
noted that by its terms, the death knell doctrine would not apply to
suits in which federal jurisdiction depends upon satisfying the juris-
dictional amount.'" A plaintiff pressing a claim in excess of' $10,000
would probably continue the suit alone, and thus the rationale under-
lying the death knell rule—the unavailability of counsel to press a
small claim"°—would be destroyed. For the same reason, when, as in
Hackett, a statutory scheme such as the Clayton Act provides a claim
for attorney's fees and costs, 147 the plaintiff could not say that he or
she could not afford counsel.' 48
These considerations in themselves would appear to have been
sufficient reason for denying the appeal. However, the court further
expanded its reasons for doing so, and in that process launched a vig-
orous attack on the death knell doctrine. Initially, the court stated its
belief that the rule would not operate in suits where the objective was
to safeguard rights incapable of' dollar measurement, such as civil
Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2c1 1143, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975) (adopting the rule
formulated by the Fifth Circuit).
' 3 ' One Circuit has rejected the death knell per curiam, King v. Kansas City S.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir, 1973), while the Third Circuit did so after a
thoughtful analysis of its applicability, Hackett v. General Host Corp„ 455 F.2d 618 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
13" 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972), noted, 29 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 465 (1972).
' 4" 455 1:,2d at 623.
'It 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
142 455 F.2d at 620.
"3 Id.
'" Id. at 626.
'" Id. This stands to reason and would follow naturally from Milberg, where the
Second Circuit found that $8,500 was sufficient incentive to pursue a claim. If a claim
alleges $10,000 damages and thus is maintainable in federal court, the plaintiff cannot
claim that his case falls within the death knell exception. Milberg, 443 F.2d at 1306-07.
14"455 F.2d at 622.
" 7 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
"" 455 F.2d at 622-23.
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rights suits, and suits seeking to protect the environment.' 49 Further,
the court acknowledged that such consumer actions as the one
brought in Hackett have beneficial deterrent effects, but believed that
such benefits must be weighed against the possibility of overloading
the appellate dockets'" and the existence and availability of alterna-
tive, discretionary means of appeal. 15 ' In this light the Third Circuit
believed that the viability of the death knell rule was questionable. 15 '
It is quite apparent that had the Third Circuit gone no further
than to say that the death knelt rule was inapplicable to the facts of
Hackett, the doctrine would not have been harmed. The court's obser-
vation that the death knell rule would operate only in that narrow
category of cases where the object of the suit is the recovery of money
damages, and where a statute affords federal jurisdiction regardless of
amount," 53
 seems a logical limitation of the doctrine, and would not
appear to vitiate its efficacy in that "narrow category." The court be-
lieved, however, that to leave even this limited area open would pro-
vide the private party an unnecessary option: In every such instance
other regulatory mechanisms are available to assert the public interest
against the wrongdoer."'" The court declined to make this option
available by adopting the death knell doctrine, or by recognizing the
situation which will toll the knell as one within the Cohen exception.'"
Hackett proved persuasive authority for the Seventh Circuit in
King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc.'" where plaintiffs, who
sought to represent former shareholders, alleged that misleading
proxy statements had been issued to induce shareholder approval of a
proposed merger.'" The district court denied certification to the
proposed class,' 88 and plaintiffs sought to bring a section 1291
appeal.' 5" In a per curiam opinion, the circuit court rejected the
death knell principle espoused in Eisen I, and declined to find that the
Cohen collateral order exception was applicable.'"
Nevertheless, the position of the death knell doctrine as a proper
exception to the rule of finality should not be compromised by the
decisions in Hackett and King. Although these courts relied on the
availability of other remedies, this availability seems to be illusory, and
Id. at 622.
' 5 " Id. at 623. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Court of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Li ARV. L. REV. 542 (1969).
151 455 F.2d at 623. Such alternatives include interlocutory appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(6) (1970), FED. R. CI v. 54(b). The district court refused to certify a sec-
tion 1292(b) appeal, 455 F.2d at 620.
152 455 F.2d at 623.
1S3
 455 F.2d at 622.
154 455 F.2d at 626.
"5 id. at 625.
156
 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973).
' 57 56 F.R.D. 96, 97 (N.D. III. 1972).
15" id. at 101.
15 " 479 F.2d at 1260.
till/ a
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in any event not pertinent to cases where the plaintiff presses only a
minimal dollar claim. The very rationale of the death knell doctrine is
that the small plaintiff will not be able to afford an attorney. Without
counsel, an unsophisticated litigant will be unable to avail himself of
other remedies. Thus despite its ad hoc nature,'" the doctrine is a
salutary one aimed at ensuring small plaintiff's a forum. As such, it
comports with congressional encouragement of the class action as a
vehicle for co-ordinating suits by small claimants, 102 and, by subjecting
large defendants to suits which otherwise might never be brought,
reinforces the deterrent policies of regulatory schemes such as the
Clayton Act.'" The unique nature of the death knell doctrine, and
the benefits that flow from the rule, ensure its position as a valid ex-
ception to the rule of finality.
Courts applying the death knell doctrine have viewed the rule as
falling within the Cohen exception, in that such orders are collateral to
the issues and separable from the merits.'" Perhaps it is conceptually
more correct to recognize that the death knell rule falls within a
Forgay-Gillespie exception, since an order denying class status to the
small claimant is one which is fundamental to the further conduct of
the case, and one which might result in irreparable harm to the
plaintiff. 16 ' Under either theory the result is the same: the order de-
nying class status to the small claimant should be considered final and
thus appealable under section 1291.
111. THE REVERSE DEATH KNELL DOCTRINE
The very nature of the death knell rule meant that it was appli-
cable only to plaintiffs; defendants arguably in the same position, that
is, defending a class action suit initiated and represented by a plaintiff.
individually possessed of a minimal claim, could not avail themselves
of a direct appeal under section 1291. The Second Circuit met the
problem of the disparate treatment accorded defendants under the
death knell rule by developing the reverse death knell doctrine.'"
Under the reverse death knell rule, a defendant may appeal an
order granting class status by meeting a three-part test. It must first
be shown that the determination is fundamental to the further con-
duct of the case; second, that a review of the order will not require an
examination into the merits of the case; and third, that the defendant
"'See Korn v. Franchard, 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., con-
curring).
1 " Kaplan, A Prefatoyy Note, 10 B.C. lrm, & Cast, L. Rite. 497 (1969).
' 4" See Hackett, 455 F.2d at 623; Williams v, Sinclair, 529 Rai 1383, 1388 (9th
Cir. 1975).
"4 E.g., Eisen 1, 370 F.2d at 120. See Hackett, 455 F.2c1 at 626, where the court
distinguished the Eisen 1 and Cohen doctrines.
"s See Hackett, 455 F.2d at 629 (Rosenti, J., dissenting).
166 Herbst v. International Tel, & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir, 1974). The
doctrine was refined in :Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir, 1974),
and General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
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will suffer irreparable harm if' review is delayed until final determina-
tion of the case."' The requirement of fundamentality is the same
requirement demanded by the death knell doctrine. To meet this re-
quirement, defendants must satisfy the court that if the order were
reversed, plaintiffs would be unable to continue the action." To ful-
fill the other two prongs of the test, defendant must show that the
district court failed to adhere to the requirements of Rule 23 in cer-
tifying the class, and must demonstrate the potential harm inherent in
the litigation expenses and aggregate damage claims.
The issue of a defendant's ability to appeal orders granting class
status was first raised in the Second.Circuit in Herbst v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp.""' There the plaintiff alleged that defen-
clam had violated the securities laws when it attempted a merger by
selling unregistered securities.'" The complaint sought damages or
nullification of the arrangement under which the plaintiff obtained
certain of the defendant's shares in exchange for a number of the
shares in the insurance company with which ITT had desired to
merge. Shortly after the action was commenced, plaintiff sought, and
was granted, status as the representative of a class whose members in-
cluded all those shareholders who similarly exchanged shares. 17 ' This
constituted a potentially enormous group: one for which the alleged
damages could conceivably have reached $110 million,'" and defen-
dant appealed the certification order. The circuit court, while allowing
the defendant's appeal, held that the district court had properly cer-
tified the class action.'"
In accepting the defendant's appeal, the court first analyzed the
point made by Judge Friendly that, in applying the death knell doc-
trine, some parity of treatment should be accorded to defendants.'"
It was suggested that short of repealing the death knell doctrine for
plaintiffs, such parity could be achieved by recognizing a similar ex-
ception for defenciants. 175 As in Eisen I, the Second Circuit again re-
lied on Cohen as the foundation for the new doctrine. 176 Thus, a de-
187 Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 131243 (2d Cir.
1974).
"" See Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1098-99 (2d Cir. 1974).
"" 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974). The matter was also considered, and appeal
was allowed, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, (Eisen III), 479 F.2d 1005, 1005 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), but, as the circuit court had re-
tained jurisdiction on remand, the question of appealability was not in issue.
LT" 495 F.2d at 1310. The merger was never perfected since the Insurance Com-
missioner refused to approve the plan. ITT then offered the Hartford Fire Insurance
Company (the intended partner in the merger) shareholders a voluntary exchange of
Hartford shares for	 preferred stock, on condition that. 95% of Hartford stock be
exchanged. More than 99% of Hartford shares were eventually exchanged. Id. at 1311.
1 ' 1 M. at 1310•
' 71 1d. at 1'313.
' 73 M. at 1309.
'" M. at 1312. See Korn, 443 F.2d at 1307 (Friendly J., concurring).
175 495 F.2d at 1311-12.
' 76 Id. at 1312.
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fendant wishing to appeal an order designating a class must show that
the order implicates issues which are fundamental to the further con-
duct of the case and which are separable from the merits. Such an
order would thus be collateral to the case itself and would hold suffi-
cient promise of avoiding an injustice to merit immediate review.
The court carefully considered the effect on the plaintiff were
the order to be reversed. However, while the majority realiZed the
possibility of ending the suit by allowing an immediate appeal, this
consideration was not the most persuasive. Rather, the burdens pre-
sented by the factors of time and expense proved more important to
the court's decision.'" Two financial aspects to the case were particu-
larly noted: the amounts of money which would probably be ex-
pended in defending a sprawling class action, and the threat implicit
in the sum represented by the potential damages.'" The court also
recognized that the mere procedural problem of notifying all mem-
bers involved significant expense and effort.'" In addition, the court
noted that the sheer size of possible liability often precipitates pre-trial
settlements which are small only in relation to the damages sought,'"
and that the supervision of large class actions necessarily involved a
significant drain on judicial time."'
The Second Circuit thus concluded that where the class is large
enough to provide in terrorem incentives to pre-trial settlement, and
where considerable amounts of time and money are involved, im-
mediate review of the class certification order is proper.'" The court
added that "as appellate judges we would be reluctant to hold that a
class action had been improper after the district court and the parties
had expended much time and resources although we might have had
serious doubts if we had reviewed the question at the inception of the
action."'" These considerations compelled the court's decision that
orders granting class status should be appealable as of right under
section 1291, rather than remaining dependent upon the district
court's discretion under section 1292(b).'"
The emphasis which was placed on the economic effects of the
class action itself demonstrates that, despite any superficial similarity
'" Id. at 1312-13.
17" The reverse death knell was affirmed in Kohn v, Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496
l',2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974). There, however, die Second Circuit relined its position on
the role played by the potentially large damage claims and litigation costs in determin-
ing whether the reverse death knell should be applied. Recognizing that all law suits
may become lengthy and expensive, the court stated that a reviewing court should focus
its investigation on the "incremental cost and time in defending the particular action
it is maintained as a class action." Id. at 1100,
""Id. at 1312-13.
"" Id. at 1313. See Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C.
IND.& COAT. L. Rt.v. 515, 522 (1969).
I" 495 F.2d at 1213.
"2 Id.
" 3 1d.
"'a at 1213 n. 9.
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to the death knell rule, the reverse death knell doctrine rests on dif-
ferent conceptual grounds: while the application of the death knell
rule turns on the widespread belief that, without such alternative, the
suit will end, the principle underlying the reverse death knell is the
fear that resources of time and money may be fruitlessly expended.
In one, the probable results govern, while in the other, the possible con-
sequences are stressed.
The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed the rationale underlying
the reverse death knell doctrine in Parkinson v. April Industries, Inc. 185
In this case, the defendant was alleged to have fraudulently manipu-
lated the price of stock in violation of the securities laws.'" The dis-
trict court granted class status to plaintiff-purchasers of the
defendant's stock,'" finding that the pre-requisites of Rule 23(a) and
23(b)(3) had been satisfied. The defendant appealed this order, but
the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, indicating that the case did
not call for application of the reverse death knell doctrine.' 88 In dis-
missing the appeal, the court initially reviewed the historical back-
ground of the final order rule of section 1291. 18 " Noting the Finality
rule's solid basis in statutory policy,'" the court cautioned against an
over-expansive application of the exceptions to this rule."'' Still, the
court acknowledged that there must be some means of immediately
appealing certain orders as of right in exceptional circumstances;
namely, in those situations where "the danger of denying justice
by delay" outweighs "the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal
review."'" Since the complexities of a class action involve a substantial
burden both on judicial time and on the resources of the defendant,
the order granting class status may result in an injustice in situations
where it could later be decided that the class was improperly desig-
nated. The argument is that an immediate section 1291 appeal by
right would cure such injustice and would obviate both the necessity
of involving the court in overseeing a complex class action, and the
possibility of taxing a defendant's finances.'"
The Second Circuit noted that allowing appeals as of right in
this area would thereby give appellate courts an opportunity to pro-
vide guidance in the developing area of class litigation. The court rec-
ognized, however, that there is a narrow "line between helpful guid-
"5 520 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1975).
I" Id, at 651. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the earnings and prospects of the
company had been overstated, in violation of Rule 106-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
1 " 520 F.2d at 651.
Is" Id. at 658.
'""Id. at 652-53.
"0 Id.
Id. at 653 n.l. See also, General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 50l F.2d
639, 645 (2d Cir. 1974); Weight Watchers of Philadelphia v. Weight Watchers
455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972).
'" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974).
1 " 520 F.2d at 655-56.
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ance and noxious interference ...." 1 " Since one goal of the final
order rule is the preservation of this narrow line by ensuring that. the
circuit courts operate only on a ripe record,'" courts must be careful
that the rule of finality is not infringed. The court emphasized that.
the class designation area is not the only one in which an immediate
appeal would remove from the district court potentially burdensome
and complex litigation. However, it confirmed the idea that the dis-
trict judges must he allowed to retain the primary control of a
litigation.''"' Thus, before allowing a section 1291 appeal, the
Parkinson court found that a reviewing court must assess not only
whether the defendant is likely to stiffer irreparable harm, 17 but also
whether the appeal involves a concrete and determinative invocation
of judicial power—not merely an exercise of its discretion.'" The
Second Circuit believed that these criteria would be satisfied""" by a
strict adherence to the three-part test of Herbs, requiring that an
order may be appealed only when fundamental to the further con-
duct of the case, when separable From the merits, and when it is
onerously burdensome on the defentlant. 2" In Parkinson, the court
applied these criteria and found that the defendant was contesting
only the district court's exercise of' discretion. Consequently, the case
was not one in which exceptional circumstances required the applica-
tion of the reverse death knell.rule. 2 "'
Judge Friendly again concurred, reiterating his position in Korn,
and stating that the inequality of the plaintiff-oriented death knell
doctrine required some positive response. Judge Friendly believed,
however, that, although the reverse death knell doctrine was intended
to remedy this inequity, it was not the proper response. 292
 Moreover,
1 " 4 Id. at 654.
"5 See text at notes 38-39.
"" 520 F.2d at 654.
" 7 Id. at 653-54.
"8
 Id. at 657. The Second Circuit quoted approvingly from its opinion in Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 1974):
Accordingly, we would review here not a finite and conclusive determina-
tion of judicial power—e.g., the power to shift notice costs and forego in-
dividualized notice as in Eisen, or the power to dispense with security, as in
Cohen—bin a discretionary decision, the propriety of which will necessarily
vary from case to case. That this distinction is of fundamental importance
in the calculus of appealability was plainly acknowledged in Cohen itself,
"H "Indeed, the three pronged test, narrowly interpreted, does not mark a de-
parture from the final judgment rule,
	 rather, it is a corrollary to the collateral order
doctrine tailored to the particular circumstances of class litigation." 520 1 7.2d at 658.
2 "" Id. at 656-58.
'"' Id. at 658. In a footnote to the opinion, the Second Circuit emphasized that
section 1292(b) appeals are the most efficient means of securing interlocutory review of
a class designation order both because the use of that section obviates the need to brief'
and argue the issue of appealability, and because the district court delineates the issue
to be decided. Id. at 655 n.5. Indeed, and seemingly for these reasons, the court went
so 1111' as to suggest that perhaps section 1292(h) should be the only means of present-
ing such orders for review, Id., citing Hackett, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972).
'"' Id. at 659. Judge Friendly commented: "However the cure may be worse titan
the disease." Id.
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Judge Friendly was willing to go even further than his position in
Korn, proposing that both the death knell doctrine and its reverse
should be discarded in deference to legislatively mandated methods of
appeal. 203 Noting that initially the death knell rule had attractive qual-
ities, Friendly believed that weaknesses in the rule had developed 214 in
two respects. First, where a named plaintiff had a claim large enough
to provide the incentive to continue the suit alone, unnamed members
of the proposed class, possessed only of very small claims, would be
denied the opportunity to press their claims where class certification is
denied. Also, there remained the problem of defining the dollar point
at which the denial of class status rang the death knell. These prob-
lems, when added to those posed by applying the three-part Herbst
test in the reverse death knell situation, led Judge Friendly to main-
tain that orders which merely gram or deny class status should be
treated as interlocutory orders appealable only under section
1292(b). 205
This view, of course, does not mandate that plaintiffs in a class
action would always be deprived . of 1291 appeals. Judge Friendly was
quick to note that certain situations, such as those presented in Eisen
I, could still be rectified through immediate appeals as of right. 2 " He
was equally quick to state., however, that this is true because such cases
fit within traditional exceptions to the final order rule. Apparently,
then, according to Friendly, there was no need to create a new excep-
tion and to label it the death knell rule.
In light of this analysis, Judge Friendly then assessed the efficacy
of the three-prong Herbst test. 217 It was his belief that the Herbst test
confuses the issue of whether class certification orders are final, since
it fails to offer a concrete standard of appealability. In support of this
position, Judge Friendly initially noted that the first prong—whether
the determination of a class is "fundamental to the further conduct of
the case"—appeared to be nothing more than the death knell doctrine
under a different name. 2 " Apparently, the suggestion is that this
prong, depending as it does on the size of the plaintiff's claim and not
the alleged harm to the defendant, does nothing more than point out
that the suit would cease were a certain class not designated. It does
not deal with any aspect peculiar to an order designating a class.
Further, Judge Friendly believed that the second prong—whether the
order is separable from the merits—is of little use in delimiting the
finality of a contested designation order, since the answer would al-
ways be in the affirmative. 21" As such, it could almost be classified as a
given, and could not be cited as a reason sufficiently compelling to
2113 Id. at 658.
2
" 4 Id. at 659.
203
 Id. at 658-59.
21m ta t 660.
217 See text at notes 167-84 supra.
2 " 520 F.2d at 658.
21/Did .
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justify bypassing the requirement of finality. Finally, the third
prong—whether the defendant will suffer irreparably in terms of
time and money—would apply only to classes which are very large. 210
Thus it would exclude appeals based on the consideration, among
others, that the class was not too numerous as to make joinder
impracticable. 2 " This analysis suggests that the issue of appealability
is one that can only be decided case-by-case. Further, it is this type of
examination which lends itself to the apparatus provided by section
1292(b), thereby avoiding constant appeals of the question of jurisdic-
tion to hear 1291 appeals. 2 ' 2
In Judge Friendly's view then, unless a class certification order
may be appealed as of right on some ground other than the death
knell or its reverse, section I292(b) is the correct avenue of appeal."
Not only does this section permit a quicker determination of whether
an appeal should lie than does section 1291, 214 but it provides as well
for valuable input by district courts. Judge Friendly noted that this
input outweighed the risk that obdurate judges may arbitrarily refuse
to certify an appeal under section 1292(b). In any event, mandamus
remains an answer to such arbitrariness, since the party may thereby
present directly to the circuit court the grounds which militate for ap-
peal. The likelihood that a district judge will succumb to such arbitrar-
iness, or that attorneys will justify spurious appeals by claiming an ar-
bitrary abuse of discretion is slim, and would not seem to foreshadow
a plethora of applications for writs of mandamus. 215 Friendly further
criticized the ad hoc nature of the determinations made under the
death knell doctrine and its reverse as having contributed expense
and delay to the litigation of jurisdictional issues. This delay results
from the fact that the threshold question before the court is whether
the appeal should be allowed, rather than whether the order was
properly entered. The litigants must then persuade the appellate
court to exert jurisdiction so that the applicability of Rule 23 may then
be a rgued. 2 ' 6
210 hi.
213 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)( I).
212
 "Since the need for review of class action orders turns on the facts of the par-
ticular case, [§ 1292(b)] is preferable to attempts to formulate standards which are
necessarily so vague as to give rise to undesirable jurisdictional litigation with concomi-
tant expense and delay." 520 F.2d at 660 (Friendly, J., concurring).
213 /d. at 660.
2"
 One requirement. is that the § 1292(h) appeal be filed within ten days of the
order. Since tins is not a full appeal, and since the district court need not stop the trial's
progress while the § 1292(b) appeal is decided, the circuit may, and often must, decide
whether to exercise its jurisdiction quickly, 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1970); Milbert v. Bison
Lab., Inc., 260 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1958).
25 520 F.20 at 660. See Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2c1 618, 624 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). Mandamus is one of the extraordinary means of
controlling and directing the trial courts. See generally, Crick, The Final judgment aS a
Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L. J. 539, 553-55 (1932).
2" 520 F.2d at 660.
125
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Judge Friendly's position has persuasive merit, except insofar
as he suggests abandoning both the death knell doctrine and its re-
verse. The logic supporting the death knell, allowing otherwise de-
fenseless plaintiffs to vindicate their rights, has an attractively equita-
ble quality to it. 21
 However, if the death knell rule is to be considered
conceptually viable, the question of the appropriateness of judicially
created exceptions encompassing orders denying class representative
status must be faced. As Judge Friendly noted, the death knell rule
originally stemmed from a belief that such a designation order is
"fundamental to the further conduct of the case."215 Also, the loss of
the claimed right would seem to qualify as an "irreparable harm."
Thus, a Forgay-Gillespie approach would seem more consistent with
tradition than use of the Cohen "collateral order" rule.'" In either
event, the existing exceptions are broad enough to provide a firm
base for the death' knell rule, so that Judge Friendly's concern that the
rule creates a new exception may very well be groundless.
While it can thus be seen that the death knell doctrine is valid,
the same cannot be said for the reverse death knell rule, for defen-
dants do not seek the vindication of allegedly violated rights. Rather,
the reverse death knell doctrine provides a vehicle to avoid the con-
gressionally approved class action mechanism, so as to minimize the
costs traditionally associated with the defense of such actions. 22 ° Con-
ceptually, therefore, the two doctrines are distinct, in that they rest on
differing policy considerations. The death knell is founded in the de-
sire to allow small claimants to vindicate allegedly violated rights,
whereas the reverse death knell rests upon affording an opportunity
for defendants to circumvent the class action. There is, therefore, no
need either to approve or decry both; accepting the death knell sim-
ply does not require adopting the reverse death kne11. 22 '
The Ninth Circuit recently adopted this position in Blackie v.
Barrack, 222
 where defendants were charged with overstating profits
and underestimating future losses223 in violation of section 10(b) and
2 " See text at notes 245-51, infra; Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d
1143 (6th Cir. 1975).
"" 520 F.2d at 659.
21" See text at notes 164-65, supra.
22"See }Mackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1975); text at notes 227-30
nifm,
"' This view seems implicit in the decisions of several circuits which have held
that, since orders granting class status do not lit within any exception to the rule of fi-
nality, section 1291 is an unacceptable means of appealing them. E.g., Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 752 (3rd Cir. 1974) (en banc); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New
York Stock Exchange, 469 F.2d 14, 17 (7th Cir. 1972); Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412
F.2d 226, 227 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam). See 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL. PRACTICE
C110.13[9] at 184 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter MooRE.].
" 2 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (Oct. 5, 1976).
222 Id, at 894.
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rule 101)-5 2" of the Securities and Exchanges Act of 1934. 225 The dis-
trict court granted class status to the plaintiff, and permitted certain
of the defendants to seek interlocutory review of this order under sec-
tion 1292(b). 226 In addition to the discretionary interlocutory appeal,
all the defendants appealed the order directly, relying on the reverse
death knell theory. 227 While the circuit court granted the section
1292(b) appeal, the section 1291 appeal was distmssed. 2" In so hold-
ing, the court initially noted the soundness of the death knell's posi-
tion in the historical framework of exceptions to the finality
doctrine. 22 " However, the Ninth Circuit found no similarly compelling
reason to accept the reverse death knell. Unlike the death knell situa-
tion, where the denial of class certification will cause the plaintiff to
terminate the action, the class certification order in Blaekie was condi-
tional and subject to alteration as the litigation continued. 2 "" Reliance
upon the Cohen collateral exception for the reverse death knell doc-
trine was therefore inapposite, since Cohen requires not only that the
denial of immediate review must result in loss of a right which cannot
be sustained by later review, but also that the order appealed must be
final and collateral."' The court in Mackie stated its intention to
adhere to this position even where doing so would result in apparent
injustice to the defendant. The court found that the district court's
ability to decertify the class in view of later events at the trial miti-
gated the need for immediate review of the certification order. Thus,
the denial of an appeal as of right would avoid the duplication of ef-
forts, including appellate consideration of an order which might later
be changed. 232
In clearly distinguishing the death knell from the reverse death
knell situation, the Ninth Circuit's examination focused on three is-
sues: the separability of a class certification order from the merits of
the case; the probability of irretrievably lost rights; and the factor of
prohibitive litigation costs. The court initially acknowledged that some
aspects of a class certification order, such as notice requirements, may
be mooted after trial begins, and thus would not resurface on final
22i
	 C.F.R.	 240,10b-5 (1975),
2 " 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
228 524 F.2d at 894-95 & n.4. Two of the defendants did not join in a motion for
reconsideration which was filed before their notices of appeal were tiled. It was as-
sumed that this took these defendants out of the court's jurisdiction.
22r
	 at 894.
225 id. at 1495.
22" Id. at 896. The court did so to avoid "Bleak House, Judicial administration,"
id. at 895, recognizing that without the death knell rule, progeny of the accepted Cohen
exception for collateral orders, "the right threatened by an adverse ruling will have
been lost in the interim before final disposition." Id.
2" Id. at 897. In ihe death knell situation also, a denial of certification may be
conditional, but if economics force the plaintiff Co quit the action, the status will never
be altered.
221 Id. See 9 MoORF:, 1110.13(9] at 184.
132 524 F.2d at 897.
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appeal. Such orders could indeed be viewed as "separable from the
merits." A difficulty encountered in applying this view to the class ac-
tion situation, however, is that a close examination of such orders very
often involves an impermissible intrusion into the merits, 233
 since it
will involve facts and issues which will later be raised, and even
clarified, at trial. Apparently, the court believed that the separability
of such orders, standing atone, is not sufficient to invoke the Cohen
collateral order rule, which is designed not to defend against possible
harm tangential to the issues central to the case, but to preserve legal
rights. It is these legal rights which the small plaintiff wishes to pro-
tect, and it is in such a case where the Cohen rule should be allowed to
operate.
The Eisen I-type plaintiff, presenting a claim of minimal dollar
value, cannot preserve his rights as an individual plaintiff; with the
denial of class certification, the action is concluded and the ability to
argue his claim is forever lost. 234 Not so for the defendant, who is free
throughout the trial to present evidence concerning the inappro-
priateness of the class action. If the verdict goes against the defendant,
the matter may again be raised at the circuit level, as one of several
exceptions to the verdict. Admittedly, this results in lost litigation ex-
penses, but the court was not persuaded that this was reason enough
to further extend the final order rule. Such irretrievably lost ex-
penses, according to the court, do not sufficiently distinguish class cer-
tification orders from other orders such as the denial of a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment, which traditionally have not been con-
sidered final. 235 The lack of immediate review in these instances simi-
larly results in an incremental increase in costs. In fact, the costs of
litigation will be reduced only if the appeal of these orders or of a
certification order is allowed, and the order is reversed. 236 It is only
when no other avenue of appeal is available that section 1291 can be
justified as a cost-saving device. Any possible savings to the defendant,
then, must be balanced against the costs in time and resources which
result when the circuit court examines the appealability of an order
under section 1291 and finds it nonappealable, or when the court al-
lows the appeal but affirms the order. 237
Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected the appellants' claim that the
23J
	 See, Note, 42 Giro. WASH. L. REV. 621, 628-29 (1974).
13d
	
F.2d at 899. See Note, 42 Ow. WASH. L. REv. 621, 629-30 (1974).
435
	 17 .2d at 898. Such orders are the refusal of motions to dismiss, for sum.
mary judgment, or Ilk separate trials. This last analogy was noted in Walsh v. City of
Detroit, 412 F.2d 226, 227 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), where the reverse death knell
rule was not accepted.
23" 524 F.2d at 898.
2" hl. See Kohn v. Royal], Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1098-99 (2d Cir.
1974); e/. Note, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 621, 629.30 (1974): "Such expense, however, has
not been considered sufficient to outweigh the policy considerations of the final judg-
ment rule which prevent piecemeal review of interlocutory rulings without the benefit
of a complete record."
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in terrorem effects of a class action represent an irreparable harm. 238
The court found this argument to be fundamentally an attack on Rule
23 itself', and stressed that the desire to place small claimants in a
litigative unit with some clout was the motive which had inspired the
Rule.23° The basis of the argument—that the size of the potential
claims forces a defendant to settle even frivolous claims"°—is a con-
comitant of the class action; it should not serve to invoke section 1291
as a vehicle to bypass Rule 23. 241
 The in terrorem argument is further
weakened by the fact that the rationale supporting the reverse death
knell remains potent even when the doctrine is itself unavailable. That
is, the reverse death knell doctrine cannot aid a defendant faced with
a small class of plaintiffs, with large individUal claims, since a prereq-
uisite of the doctrine is that, should the plaintiffs be denied rep-
resentative status, the action would terminate. 242 A discrete class then,
with each member voicing a large claim, will represent an incentive to
pre-trial settlement similarly forceful to that presented by a very large
class of small claimants. 243
 To rely on the possibility of an onerous lia-
bility to circumvent the final order rule is to open every class suit to
the same attack, thereby vitiating at once the class action and the final
order doctrine.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF CERTIFICATION ORDERS
It would seem, therefore, as suggested by Judge Friendly 244 and
the Ninth Circuit, 245
 that section 1292(6) is a more appropriate means
of appealing orders granting class status than is the reverse death
knell doctrine. This conclusion is dt'awn from several factors. First,
plaintiffs and defendants in a death' knell situation are not actually
similarly situated. Second, the order certifying a class action is tenta-
tive only, and furthermore, these orders are susceptible to the ap-
paratus of appeal contained in section 1292(b). The plaintiff in the
death knell situation—as in Eisen I —presses a very small claim which
arises from the alleged violation of a right. The plaintiff who is de-
nied representative status loses not only the chance of recovering the
minimal judgment, but also, and more importantly, the possibility of
vindicating his own rights since he will most probably be forced to
foresake a claim altogether. The defendant, on the other hand, has
the opportunity to litigate the merits fully, and to attack continually
the validity of the certification order. The defendant, while forced to
"' 524 F.2d at 899.
239 1d.
240
	 v. International Tel. & Tel„ 495 F.2d 1308, 1313 (2d Cir. 1974).
24"
	 at 899.
242 Kohn, 496 F.2d at 1098.
2a'
	 F.2d at 899.
2" See text at notes 212-13 supra.
242 See text at notes 222-33 supra.
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contend with admittedly burdensome expenses, does not face irretriev-
ably lost rights. The parties are thus differently situated and may be
differently treated. 246
In addition, the order allowing a class action to proceed is often
tentative and therefore not "ripe." The oftentimes conditional nature
of the order indicates that the record bearing on whether or not class
certification is appropriate is not fully developed. 247 It may well be
that a decision by an appellate court concerning a certification order
would be futile, since the same result would have been reached by the
trial judge in the course of events. Such an intrusion into the duties of
the district court would thus fall beyond the narrow "line between
helpful guidance and noxious interference ...." 248
 Also, an order not
yet "ripe" may not actually be separable from the merits. It is for this
reason that the Supreme Court specifically stated in Cohen that tenta-
tive orders could not be considered collateral and are therefore not
final for purposes of review. 24 ° If they are not final, then of course,
section 1291 is not applicable, and the only means of obtaining im-
mediate appellate review is through the discretionary process available
under section 1292(b). Since the reverse death knell is based upon the
Cohen exception to the final order rule, 25 ° the doctrine loses its valid-
ity when the certification order is seen to be not collateral to, and
separable from, the merits. Even if the analysis suggested above"' is
adopted, and the rule is viewed as an offshoot of the death knell
doctrine's position within the parameters of a Forgay-Gillespie excep-
tion, an order certifying a class would not require treatment as a final
order. First, as to the defendant, the certification of a class is not fun-
damental to the further conduct of the case; the defendant can con-
Blaeltie, 524 F.2d at 898-99; Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. RfA'. 621, 631 (1974).
247 language of Rule 23(c)(1) is explicit on this point: "An order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on
the merits." Fv.n. R. GIN'. P. 23(c)(1). See Note, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 621, 631 (1974).
See also In re King Resources Co, v. Bottger, 525 F.2d 211, 213 (10th Cir. 1975); Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 646-47 (2d Cir. 1974) (Where,
refusing to apply the reverse death knell theory, the court said that, unlike Cohen and
Eisen I, the "determination to permit the City's action to proceed as a class action is very
much 'tentative,' subject always to reconsideration as the cause of action unfolds.");
Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226, 227 (fith Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
248
 Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975). See text at
note 170 supra.
21" Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see also, Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650,
653 (2d Cir. 1975):
An order granted prior to discovery may be reevaluated on the basis of
facts emerging from a fuller record, and a decision by an appellate court
upon an appeal from the initial order would not settle the propriety of the
designation once and for all because new information might well require a
revision of the original order by the district court. The possible likelihood
of successive appeals on the same issue, a concern which lies at the heart
of the final judgment rule, exists.
2" See text at note 165 supra.
"' See text at note 235 supra.
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tinue to argue the matter. 252 Further, the expenses involved in de-
fending a class action grow directly out of the concept underlying this
type of suit: they are not unique to a suit being brought by a group of
small claimants, 253 and therefore cannot be classified as irreparable in-
jury or substantial harm.
Finally, an order granting class status may satisfy the three ele-
ments of section 1292(h), and receive interlocutory appellate
review. 254 The first, whether the issue is novel, presents little diffi-
culty; even though Rule 23 has been law for a decade, its contours
remain relatively undefined. 255 Therefore, issues involved in granting
class status can be certified to the circuit court as novel. Nor is there
any doubt that the second test, whether an appeal would materially
advance the litigation, will usually be satisfied, since a reversal of the
order would likely terminate the action. 255 It is the third criterion,
whether the order involves a controlling question of law, which is not
so easily answered, and it is in answering this question that the trial
judge will probably most often exercise his or her discretion. There-
fore, it is this criterion which will likely control appealability of an
order granting class status under section 1292(b), and it is thus this
criterion which will most concern the district judge who is faced with
a motion for a section 1292(b) interlocutory appeal.
Still, the grant or denial of class status is not completely within
the discretion of the district court, for there is the objective, statutory
framework of Rule 23 to apply. 257 Thus, in determining whether an
issue involves a controlling question of law, a judge should not be too
concerned with the question of whether an order is purely discretion-
ary or purely non-discretionary, appealable or not. Rather, the focus
of the examination should be on the case as a whole, to see if the
order, if left unchanged, might result in extended and extensive liti-
gation. If so, then the order would fall within the parameters of sec-
tion 1292(b). As the Third Circuit has stated in Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp.: 258 "The key consideration is not whether the order involves the
2" Blackie, 524 F.2d at 897.
'" See text at notes 238-41 supra.
254 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See text at notes 48-60 supra.
455 See, e.g., Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 655 (2d Cir. 1975).
258
 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754-55 (3c1 Cir. 1975).
257
 Note, 70 Coistst, L. REv, 1292, 1295 (1970). See, Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94
(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (t969).
258
 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir, 1974) (en banc). In Katz, an order granting class status
was reviewed under § 1292(b). Plaintiff had sued a national credit card company for
violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970). Class status was
granted, and the district court certified a § 1292(b) appeal. 53 F.R.D. 539, 547 (W.D.
Pa. 1971). The circuit court believed that a section 1292(b) appeal of' this order was
mandated by the primary aims of that section, which were to remedy the dissatisfaction
with needlessly extended litigation, and to cure the uncorrectable harm which some-
dines results from a harsh use of the final judgment rule. 996 F.2d at 753. As the
Third Circuit concluded: "In this case, .. • there exists by virtue of the order appealed
from both the possibility of prejudice to a party pendente lite and the possibility of con-
siderable avoidable wasted trial time and litigation expense." Id. at 756.
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exercise of discretion, but whether it truly implicates the policy favor-
ing interlocutory appeal." 26° The manner in which the judiciary has
thus far applied section 1292(b) suggests that this type of overview is
the preferred test of appealability. 260 Thus, when one focuses on the
course a case is likely to follow, the question whether a certification
order will produce burdensome costs of time and money, is suscepti-
ble to resolution. If the district judge decides that an unnecessarily ex-
tended and costly trial will be avoided if a disputed ruling is reversed,
then section 1292(b) will be triggered and the judge may certify the
order for appeal, regardless of whether some discretion is involved.
It would further seem that, although sections 1291 and 1292(b)
are complementary, in that each mechanism is designed to cover a
distinct class of orders, a particular order may possess characteristics
of both.'" Use of one mechanism of appeal over another will then
depend upon the exigencies of the case. This overlap of the two sec-
tions was suggested by the Supreme Court in Gillespie. Although ac-
cepting a section 1291 appeal, the Court noted that the appeal could
properly have been brought under section 1292(b). 262 However, as the
order was fundamental to the further conduct of the case, the circuit
court acted correctly in allowing a section 1291 appeal, for it "prop-
erly implemented the same policy congress sought to promote in
§ 1292(b) by treating this obviously marginal case as final and appeal-
able under ... § 1291 . "263
 A prerequisite to this proposition seems to
have been the "fundamental" nature of the order; without an im-
mediate appeal as of right, the case would have gone no further. Ar-
guably, an order granting class status is not "fundamental" in this
sense. The litigation will likely proceed; each party will be fully able to
present its case and to rebut the other's. It is suggested, then, that a
certification order is susceptible to definition as non-final, and does
not present a situation where the congressionally approved method of
appeal must be avoided by judicial legislation. This is particularly the
case when one considers the present congestion in the federal court
system, for the reverse death knell rule often results in excessive litiga-
tion of the question of jurisdiction to hear section 1291 appeals. A firm
principle of non-appealability would alleviate these appeals, and leave
the circuit courts free to consider discretionary appeals.'"
"9 496 F.2d at 756.
28°E.g., Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.
1972); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S.
291 (1973), noted, Comment, 16 B.C. IND. & Conn. L. REV. 609 (1975); Kauffman v.
Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971)
(a § 1292(b) appeal where the grant of class status was reviewed and reversed); Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
261 See text at notes 76-78 ;orpro.
262 Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 154.
263 Id.
2" Some idea or the time and expense involved in the area of appealing a certifi-
cation order might be gained upon considering that. after extensive research, only one
case has been found in which an immediate appeal of an order designating a class has
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An argument could be made that an obdurate judge might re-
fuse to certify for appeal .an order that had just been entered,'" and
that if the reverse death knell doctrine is vitiated, there will be no re-
view of an order granting class status. Therefore, without the option
of a section 1291 appeal, the defendant might suffer irreparable
harm. Such a contention glosses over the fact that the defendant does
not lose rights, since his claims may either be preserved or will merge
in a final judgment favorable to the defendant. Since there is no indi-
cation that the district courts will be reluctant to certify appeals, this
argument provides a tenuous basis for refusing to recognize section
1292(b) as the legislatively approved method of appeal. 266 Addition-
ally, even if there is a claim of abuse at the district level, there re-
mains the remedy of mandamus, through which the defendant may
present his claim to the circuit court and seek to compel the certifica-
tion of the appeal.'"
A strong argument can thus be made that section 1292(b) is the
preferred method of appealing certification orders. 268 The very avail-
ability of the remedy indicates a congressional belief that a limited in-
trusion into the rule of finality is required to provide for those excep-
tional cases where a defendant might suffer harm. 209 In view of this
policy, the courts should be slow to create remedies for the same in-
been allowed, Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel., 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974). A
blanket rule against § 1291 appeals of orders allowing a case to proceed as a class action
would have prevented wasteful appeals.
"5 See, Note, 70 COLUNI. L. RES'. 1292, 1296 (1970).
255 As the court commented in Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 624
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972):
We have had no indication that the district courts of this circuit will reject
applications under 1292(6) or Rule 54(b), arbitrarily or in disregard of
the policy considerations farming, where feasible, consumer class actions
warranted by federal statutes. If in isolated instances arbitrariness creeps
in, there remains the ultimate remedy of mandamus.
2" Id, The court suggested that the remedy of mandamus has been used more
frequently since Cohen. Id. at n.10. Mandamus is, besides a check on judicial mis-
behavior, a mechanism for promoting even administration of justice. La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957); 9 MOORS, 9 110.28 at 312. See Interpace
Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 438 F,2d 401 (3d Cir. 1971) (mandamus sought, unsuc-
cessfully, to challenge a class certification order).
788 A proposition with which the Second Circuit seems more and more willing to
agree. See Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 656 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975). Cf., In
re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975), where the court, noting
the position advocated by Judge Friendly, and that taken by the Third, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits (that certification orders should never be appealable under §
1291) stated: "The precedents in our circuit require us, however, to apply a three-
pronged test which .permits appeal from such orders in a narrow range of circum-
stances." Id. at 10 n.8. The court went on to find that the test had not been met, so that
the result would have been the same, regardless of whether the test was that of Judge
Friendly, or that of previous Second Circuit cases.
269 It should be recalled that Congress particularly intended § 1292(b) to provide
for those situations where non-final orders are entered in a plaintiff's favor. See S. REP,
No. 2434, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & Amur:. NEws, at 5256 (1958); text
at note 104 .supra.
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jury; any further intrusion into the final order rule should initiate in
Congress. At present, there are two methods of appealing orders in-
volving controlling questions of law which, if reviewed, might obviate
needlessly extended and expensive litigation: one is statutory—section
1292(b); and the other is judicial—the reverse death knell doctrine.
There is thus an excess of remedies, a problem which may be resolved
simply: the judicially created exception to the rule of finality should
defer to the legislatively approved method of appealing interlocutory
orders.
CONCLUSION
Since the inception of our judicial system, the courts have recog-
nized that an unyielding adherence to the rule of finality will often
visit unnecessary hardship on certain claimants. Certain exceptions to
the final order rule were therefore defined, resulting in the treatment
of orders which were otherwise interlocutory as final and thus ap-
pealable by right under section 1291. More recently, with the increase
in class litigation, the death knell doctrine, aimed at allowing the suits
of small claimants to continue, was engrafted .onto the existing excep-
tions to section 1291. The logic supporting this relatively new doctrine
fits well within the framework which supports the approved excep-
tions to finality. Even more recently, however, the reverse death knell
doctrine has appeared. The question presented by this doctrine,
whether orders granting class status should be considered final and
appealable by right under section 1291, or interlocutory, and appeal-
able only at the discretion of both district and circuit courts under sec-
tion 1292(b) has not received uniform acceptance among the circuits.
It would appear that the reverse death knell doctrine does not fall
within the traditional framework of judicial exceptions and therefore
represents an intrusion into the established rule of finality. Section
1292(b) appeals, however, do not intrude impermissibly into the final
order rule, since such appeals do not lie as of right but are subject to
judicial discretion. The reverse death knell doctrine was created to
remedy the injury which Congress intended to alleviate through sec-
tion 1292(b). There is no need for both, and the judicially created
doctrine should be displaced by the exercise of legislative prerogative.
Appeal of certification orders should therefore be brought only under
section 1292(b).
JAMES P. LAUGI-ILIN
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